During our annual NCUSLR conference held on November 13th, 2018 in Washington DC, many participants raised questions to the speakers that we could not respond to due to time limits.
As such, we have initiated a series of follow up interviews with our conference speakers to answer these lingering questions.
As you go through these questions and answers please keep in mind that neither the questions nor answers reflect the opinions of NCUSLR.
Presenter featured in the following Interview:
Wolfgang Pusztai, Chairman of the NCUSLR Advisory Board and MENA Policy & Security Analyst
Wolfgang Pusztai is a freelance security and policy analyst with a special focus on the MENA region. He has both a military and an academic background in strategy. Wolfgang’s military experience ranges from various positions on the strategic level in the Austrian MoD/General Staff to several international assignments (national, EU and NATO); including serving as Austria’s Defense Attache to Italy, Greece, Tunisia, and Libya from 2007 to 2012. He also has long-term experience in the intelligence business. He serves as the Chairman of the NCUSLR Advisory board and a Director at Perim Associates.
Presented at the 2nd Annual NCUSLR Conference on Panel I, The Libyan Political Process: Quo Vadis and on Panel II, Security in Libya: From Containment to Selective Engagement. Topics: “Alternatives to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA): What options?" and "The Libyan National Army (LNA) & the militias: What is the military solution?"
View Wolfgang Pusztai’s LPA presentation here
View Wolfgang’s LNA & Militias presentation here
Post-Conference Interview with Wolfgang Pusztai:
Military power can be used to consolidate the areas of influence of the major players and
to fight terrorist groups like AQIM and the IS, especially in the south. Any major
confrontation between the larger blocks, in particular between the LNA and Misrata, but
also an attempt to assume power in Tripoli by force by one of those, could easily lead to
However, overwhelming military power can be also used to pressure opponents and convince some militias to change sides in order to avoid a bloodshed - or to deter an attack.
Libya needs an interim framework to get stabilized. This could be the slightly amended
old constitution from 1963. Based on this and on a series of local ceasefires, the country
needs to be stabilize bottom-up using the governorates or the historic regions as the
An international supervision of a ceasefire would be required to identify any violators
clearly. This needs to include sophisticated technical equipment. The establishment of a
safe zone in Tripoli for the government would be very beneficial, but due to the high
associated risks it is not realistic that there will be suitable forces available for this. On
the other side, an invitation from a proper Libyan authority would be required, but this is
unlikely to happen, as all those who are benefiting from the current chaos would strongly
The best case is some kind of regional stabilization with a weak central government. The
worst case is an all-out civil war.
Yes, they are still very much present in Libya, in particular in northern Tripolitania, and
receive support from Turkey and Qatar. The more people are disappointed from
developments, the more political Islam could be considered an option by them.
Haftar is still the unifying and single most influential person in Eastern Libya.
Furthermore, he is the focal point of international contacts of the LNA. In both roles, he
is currently indispensable. Haftar is a staunch supporter of a unified Libya. As such, he
will not address any eastern grievances directly. For him, this can be probably solved by
replacing the current government(s) of Libya with a new one.
The views shared in this published interview reflect those of the guest contributor and not necessarily the views of the National Council on U.S.-Libya Relations.